Legislative History, the Neutral, Dispassionate Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the Latter Ideals through the Former Tool by Barrett, Jesse M.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 73 | Issue 3 Article 15
February 2014
Legislative History, the Neutral, Dispassionate
Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the
Latter Ideals through the Former Tool
Jesse M. Barrett
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jesse M. Barrett, Legislative History, the Neutral, Dispassionate Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the Latter Ideals through the
Former Tool, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 819 (1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol73/iss3/15
NOTE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, THE NEUTRAL,
DISPASSIONATE JUDGE, AND LEGISLATIVE
SUPREMACY: PRESERVING THE LATTER
IDEALS THROUGH THE FORMER TOOL
"You must appoint judges... to mete out proper justice to the
people. You must not pervert the law; you must be impartial.' Justice
Frankfurter, while not as authoritative a source, echoed this senti-
ment: "When the judge, selected by society to give meaning to what
the legislature has done, examines the statute .... [ w] e must assume
in him not only personal impartiality but intellectual disinterested-
ness."2 Although one would hesitate to elevate legislation of the
United States Congress to the level of divine promulgation, the notion
that an adjudicator should treat pronouncements of the legislature
with a removed neutrality is firmly embedded in the structure of the
American constitutional system and judicial tradition.
This presumed dispassionateness merges with the principle of
legislative supremacy which dictates that, apart from constitutional is-
sues, judges are subordinate to legislatures in creating public policy.
3
If this role "means anything at all, it must somehow constrain judges
who interpret statutes from implementing their own notions of public
policy."4 A judge who is not dispassionate can neither faithfully ad-
here to the decisions made by Congress, nor set aside personal policy
preferences, when deciding a case.
This fundamental principle indicates the necessity of another,
equally important aspect of neutrality. A neutral judge must respect
the means which the legislative body chooses to formulate and imple-
NT2,FN='l'>Deuteronomy 16: 18-19 (emphasis added).
2 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 529 (1947).
3 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo.
LJ. 281, 281 (1989).
4 Id. at 282.
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ment its notions of public policy. The judiciary should not only en-
force the superior role of Congress by faithfully interpreting its
legislative choices, but it must also defer to the rules by which the
legislature chooses to construct its laws. To use an analogy, a referee
in a basketball game may signal a foul on a shot, but he may not sec-
ond-guess the wisdom of the player in deciding to take that particular
shot.
The question of the appropriate judicial role has arisen with great
force in the debate centered on the invocation of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. The use of such history to determine legisla-
tive intent in cases of statutory ambiguity enjoys a long and rooted
tradition in American legal practice. Indeed, for a century, the
Supreme Court has "routinely treated the declarations of intent found
in committee reports and sponsor's statements as especially 'authori-
tative' evidence of the intent of Congress as a whole."5 This process,
however, has been challenged in the last two decades, and the Court
has gradually diminished its employ.6
The questions concerning legislative history have produced a di-
versity ofjudicial approaches, a cacophony of impassioned voices, and
a wealth of secondary literature. Can a legislative body have a collec-
tive will? Public choice theorists and textualist judges have argued
that it is error to attribute a single congruent intent to such a large
group of persons with diverse interests.7 Doesjudicial examination of
legislative history violate the constitutional structure? Scholars have
argued that the use of background legislative materials contravenes
the bicameralism, presentment, and veto provisions of Article I of the
Constitution,8 while a recent article challenges its employ as an un-
constitutional form of legislative self-delegation.9 Is legislative history
an accurate expression of congressional deliberation? A student note
5 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
674 (1997).
6 Judge Wald pointed out that, in 1981, the Supreme Court relied on legislative
history in almost every statutory case it decided in that year. Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 195 (1983). By 1989, the Court decided ten out of about sixty-five cases without
any reference to legislative history. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History
in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 846, n.5 (1992). In 1990, the Court decided
nineteen out of fifty-five without its use. See id. at 846, n.6.
7 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994).
8 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 538-40
(1983); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuxE
L.J. 371, 376.
9 See Manning, supra note 5.
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has argued that such materials are corrupt and that legislators often
invent "legislative history" solely to influence judicial
determinations.10
The focus of this current inquiry, however, is narrow in scope:
what treatment of legislative history is most consistent with, and best
preserves, the ideal of a "neutral, dispassionate judge"" and the corre-
sponding principle of legislative supremacy? Given that "the irrespon-
sible judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he
desires and the stupid judge will do the same thing unconsciously,"'
12
what is the best approach to ensure an appropriate role for the rest of
the bench? Not only is the use of legislative history to clarify statutory
ambiguity and discern legislative intent consistent with a restrained
and neutral judiciary, but it also upholds the principle of legislative
supremacy. By forswearing any resort to the legislative history of a law,
the judiciary would (1) create significant opportunities to substitute
its policy views for those of the democratically-elected legislative
branch, and (2) accrue the authority to evaluate the efficacy and wis-
dom of the means which Congress chooses to formulate legislation.
This having been said, however, the present congressional
method of articulating legislative history, and the prevalent judicial
examination thereof, is not without its flaws. All sources of legislative
history are not equally revelatory, and if a judge either fails to under-
stand the legislative process or neglects to cautiously weigh the state-
ments of "intent" revealed in the history of a statute, the judge can fail
to implement the policy directives of Congress. For this reason, re-
form, education, and intra-branch communication are necessary to
ensure thatjudicial examination of legislative history preserves the ap-
propriate congressional role as the "first branch" of government.
To establish this thesis, this Note will first provide a background
to the issue of statutory interpretation. Part II delineates the two pri-
mary approaches to statutory history: textualism and "legi-textual-
ism.' 3 After arguing that the latter approach best safeguards judicial
10 See Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105
HARv. L. REv. 1005 (1992).
11 Starr, supra note 8, at 374.
12 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800, 817 (1983).
13 I borrow this term from Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualisim
as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585 (1994). Professor Spence notes that "there
may be no ideal and succinct labels to counterpose 'textualist' and 'textualism,'" but
chooses "'legi-textualist' for two reasons: first, the term suggests the countering of the
textualists' perspective on both statutory interpretation, and on the legislative process
itself; and second, because it emphasizes that'relevant 'text' often includes nonstatu-
tory texts, such as legislative history, that the legislature generates." Id. at 587 n.7.
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neutrality and legislative supremacy, Part III briefly examines the prac-
tical formation of legislative history. The Note concludes by advanc-
ing and explicating several suggestions for reform.
I. INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Statutory interpretation is a crucial issue in what Judge Calabresi
has coined "the age of statutes."'14 Even fifty years ago, Justice Frank-
furter noted that "courts have ceased to be the primary makers of law
in the sense in which they 'legislated' the common law. It is certainly
true of the Supreme Court that almost every case has a statute at its
heart or close to it."'15 The dawn of this era has also intensified the
frequency of statutory complexity and ambiguity. Congress continues
to pass laws that "require interpretation, deal with more and more
complicated subjects and involve more and more technical
expertise."
16
This modem legislative phenomenon combines with the inher-
ent uncertainty of language to complicate the judicial function. Lan-
guage is, of necessity, indeterminate: "Words do not have natural
meanings; language is a social enterprise."' 7 The context of a phrase
provides its accurate interpretation. For example, in his well-known
passage, Wittgenstein asserts: "Someone says to me: 'Shew the chil-
dren a game.' I teach them gaming with dice, and the other says, 'I
didn't mean that sort of game.' Must the exclusion of the game with
dice have come before his mind when he gave me the order?"'u The
context of the statement provides meaning to its plain language.
Statutory interpretation, then, involves two basic steps:
"[D] etermining whether a statutory provision has a plain and unam-
biguous meaning and, if it does not, deciding which of the possible
meanings will prevail."19 The resolution of such an ambiguity, analo-
gous to the Wittengenstein example, involves a search for context in
which to place the unclear language.
14 GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
15 Frankfurter, supra note 2, at 527.
16 Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 382
(1987).
17 Frank H. Easterbrook, Wat Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
R'v. 441, 443 (1990).
18 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 33 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1953), quoted in Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1247,
1251 (1990).
19 Spence, supra note 13, at 591.
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Consistent with the constitutional structure, the judge must place
the language in the context which best effectuates the intentions of
Congress as expressed when it passed the legislation.20 The debate at
hand focuses on the materials that can be consulted in that task. Op-
tions include dictionary definitions, the role of the phrase in the text,
other related statutes, canons of construction, and legislative history.
With regard to the latter, courts have developed a general hierarchy
of sources:
Traditionally-and as a general matter-committee report explana-
dons are considered more persuasive and reliable than statements
made during floor debates or during hearings on a bill. Within the
category of floor debates, statements of sponsors and explanations
by floor managers usually are accorded the most weight, and state-
ments by other committee members are next in importance. State-
ments by Members not associated with sponsorship or committee
consideration of a bill are accorded little weight and statements by
bill opponents generally are discounted or considered unreliable.
Committee hearings are generally treated the same way as floor de-
bates: statements by sponsors or drafters are most persuasive, views
of other witnesses seldom carry much weight, and fears of oppo-
nents usually are dismissed as unreliable. 2'
This hierarchy, while neither official nor universal, is representative of
a generally-accepted framework of legislative history.
II. APPROACIES TO THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Textualism
Textualists begin from the premise that "the text of the statute-
and not the intent of those who voted for or signed it-is the law."22
They argue that utilizing legislative history to interpret ambiguous
statutes can subvert the "plain meaning" of the statutory language and
elevate to the level of law material which has neither been voted upon
in Congress nor presented to the President for approval, in violation
of Article I of the Constitution.23 Legislative history also lacks the "le-
gitimacy of statutory provisions generated through this process, be-
20 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
21 George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Rela-
tive Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History,
1990 DuKE L.J. 39, 41-42.
22 Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 444.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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cause it has not been adopted, written or even, perhaps read by any
elected officials.
24
Textualists, influenced in part by public choice theory, further
assert that it is fictive to speak of legislative intent: "The ultimate issue
raised by these judges is the extent to which legislation reflects a co-
herent congressional view of the public interest. '25 No collective body
as large as Congress can possess a single will, and the legislature is
composed of a multitude of individual groups pursuing particular in-
terests, which are often directly opposed to the desires of other
factions.
Two criticisms of legislative history are particularly relevant to this
analysis. First, textualists argue that "legislative history can permit
judges to impose their own values and policy preferences on unclear
statutory provisions,"26 compromising the ideal of dispassionate neu-
trality. The textualists would seek to prevent judges from making pub-
lic policy by denying the opportunity to selectively highlight, for
example, an unrepresentative floor statement. Because there is such a
volume of legislative history, and because it is often inconclusive, a
judge could consciously or unconsciously bend it to his own motives,
compromising dispassionateness and derogating legislative
supremacy.
Second, even if a "collective congressional intent" exists, legisla-
tive history fails to reveal it. Many Members often fail to read commit-
tee reports, the documents taken by users of legislative history as the
most authoritative sources of legislative intent.27 Legislative history is
easily manipulated, moreover, by lobbyists and special interest groups,
so that statements in the record do not necessarily reflect the position
of any legislators. Further, because Members of Congress know that
judges will analyze legislative history, there are "great incentives to in-
troduce comments in the record solely to influence future interpreta-
tions." 28 As a result, no guarantee exists that legislative history
provides the context intended by the legislature.
How, then, would a textualistjudge discern "fair and reasonable
meaning" from a statutory text? Justice Scalia, one of the most promi-
nent textualists, summarized an approach:
24 Spence, supra note 13, at 592.
25 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REv. 423, 424 (1988). Viewing political science through the lens of economics,
public choice theorists argue that legislation represents compromises generated by
interest groups driven by their individual economic interests.
26 Spence, supra note 13, at 593.
27 See Costello, supra note 21, at 41-43.
28 Note, supra note 10, at 1017.
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The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined,
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been un-
derstood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but
rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with
context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been un-
derstood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most com-
patible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision
must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we
assume Congress always has in mind.
29
First, the adjudicator should interpret a statute according to its plain
meaning. In the case of an ambiguity in the text, the judge would
determine whether one use of the term comports better with the rest
of the statute as a whole. If confusion persists, the judge should pro-
vide an interpretation which makes the best sense of the statute in
light of other related statutes.
B. Legi-Textualism
The legi-textualists broadly assert that, in cases of statutory ambi-
guity, the judiciary may consult legislative history. Two primary ap-
proaches therein are the imaginative reconstruction position, in
which ajudge attempts to assume the position of the legislature, and a
moderated approach, in which legislative history is one of many avail-
able interpretive tools to be utilized, depending upon the circum-
stances. Both refer to legislative history, but in different measure and
for different ends.
According to the imaginative reconstruction approach, also
termed the congressional agent mode of interpretation, the judge at-
tempts to discover:
[W]hat the law-maker meant by assuming his position, in the sur-
roundings in which he acted, and endeavoring to gather from the
mischiefs he had to meet and the remedy by which he sought to
meet them, his intention with respect to the particular point in
controversy.30
Judges Learned Hand and Richard Posner are two of the most-noted
proponents of this theory. The latter, for example, would apparently
29 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
30 Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 379, 381 (1907), quoted
in William N. Eskridge, Legislative History Values, 66 Cus.-IKETr L. REv. 365, 384-85
(1990).
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utilize it in every instance of statutory interpretation, not just in cases
of ambiguity.
31
A judge applies such an approach by examining the "language
and apparent purpose of the statute, its background and structure, its
legislative history (especially the committee reports and the floor
statements of the sponsors), and the bearing of related statutes."
32
The judge also takes into account "the values and attitudes, so far as
they are known today, of the period in which the legislation was en-
acted,"33 as well as "any sign of legislative intent regarding the free-
dom with which he should exercise his interpretive function."3 4 In
short, judges adopting this technique should focus on the precise po-
sition of the legislature to place themselves as nearly as possible in its
shoes.
Others, meanwhile, have advanced a more cautious use of legisla-
tive history. Justice Breyer argues, for example, that although legisla-
tive history should not be the sole or supreme judicial refuge, it is one
of many tools, including "context, tradition, custom, precedent, dic-
tionary meanings, [and] administrability, '35 which judges should se-
lectively use to interpret ambiguous statutory language. The judge
need not adopt the position of the legislature, but a cogent under-
standing of the considerations which informed its decisions is helpful.
He concludes that "the 'problem' of legislative history is its 'abuse,'
not its 'use.' Care, not drastic change, is all that is warranted."3 6
Formerjudge Abner Mikva advances a pragmatic argument for
utilizing legislative history, based upon the realities of the legislative
process. Statutes are inherently ambiguous, even more so than lan-
guage in other contexts, because compromise is the essence of the
law-making function. A legislator must accommodate various and hos-
tile views in order to marshal the votes for his bill, and lacks unlimited
time and resources to perfect its language.3 7 As a result of this pro-
cess, "there are very few statutes which on their face clearly express
what Congress intended."38 In order to understand the resulting lan-
guage, one must review the arguments which compose the legislative
history.
31 See Posner, supra note 12, at 817-18.
32 Id. at 818.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Breyer, supra note 6, at 861.
36 Id. at 874.
37 See, e.g., Mikva, supra note 16, at 381.
38 Id. at 383.
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Mikva recognizes that the courts should not construct new stat-
utes for the legislature: "[I]f Congress has not done its job, the courts
should not do it for them.... Many times the ambiguity in a statute is
in a genuine zone of unresolved policy; the courts ought to recognize
these situations and leave them alone."39 Often, however, Congress
has expressed a definite public policy, but the statutory language is
insufficient to eliminate all ambiguities. The courts, in order to limit
themselves and preserve the primacy of the legislative branch,
cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools which members of Con-
gress use to explain what they are doing and to describe the mean-
ing of the words used in the statute .... [T]he alternative is to give a
judge the relatively unrestrained power to look just at the statute's
words and at Webster's Dictionary, and to decide with Webster's
what the law of the land will be.
40
This approach is different from imaginative reconstruction insofar as
it utilizes legislative history to understand the legislative process, not
the particular values, mentalities, and positions of the legislators
themselves.
III. WHICH APPROACH BEST SAFEGUARDS JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY
AND LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY?
A. Textualism
The textualist approach is attractive in its simplicity, appealing in
its rigidity, and comforting in its clarity. Statutes are "the law," and in
their text resides the legislative will. Any ambiguities can be resolved
primarily, if not exclusively, by resort to other statutory texts. This is
desirable because it offers the possibility of isolating an objective ap-
proach, disallowing any excess of subjective discernment or overstep-
ping of judicial bounds.
Unfortunately, however, textualism's simplicity belies several sig-
nificant flaws which enable substitution of the judicial will for the leg-
islative, or at least misinterpretation thereof. Textualists seek to find
context by resort to other statutes, but in so doing they resort to other
words which "do not have natural meanings."41 This approach could
be appropriate in the presence of a fixed and absolute context, but
other variable statutory texts do not provide this determinacy. For ex-
ample, the First Circuit faced a case which involved interpretation of
the term "core proceeding" in a bankruptcy statute, a phrase which
39 Id. at 382.
40 Id. at 386.
41 Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 443.
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federal law had not previously utilized.42 Resort to other statutory lan-
guage, therefore, was unavailing. In such cases, tools do not exist to
guide judicial interpretation of congressional will, so little alternative
exists butjudicial innovation. Fortunately, the court consulted legisla-
tive history, and floor statements of the bill's sponsors clarified the
intended usage of the word.
43
The primary, apparent strength of textualism is simultaneously its
greatest weakness. Because derivation of context from dictionary
meanings and canons of construction necessitates resort to sources
outside the legislative process, it cracks the door for judicial policy-
making, whether or not intended. Language needs a context, but
there is no guarantee that a dictionary will provide the legislative
meaning, and no certainty that the reasonable person would appro-
priately construe a technical phrase. It may not be possible to know
whether the dictionary interpretation, or a canon of construction
never agreed upon by Congress, provides the meaning which it in-
tended. With this lack of direction, judges must exercise excessive
judgment and are forced to implement their individual interpreta-
tions as default principles.
Because the resort to context outside the legislative process is re-
moved from the moorings provided by Congress, it provides room for
significant judicial discretion. Although textualists criticize use of leg-
islative history because it could allow a judge to isolate a misrepresen-
tative portion of the congressional history to implement his or her
own policy, the decision is at least based upon a statement or text
actually formulated by a congressperson, or an agent thereof. Indeed,
an empirical study of decisions made by Reagan-appointed judges
concluded that "reliance on the plain-meaning approach tends to re-
sult in conclusions consistent with a judge's own political preferences
and inconsistent with, or at least indifferent to, congressional policy
choices."44
The textualist position compromises judicial neutrality in another
crucial manner. Not only does it entail the risk of a statutory interpre-
tation not intended by Congress, but it explicitly derogates the
method which Congress has chosen to formulate its laws. The neutral
judge must not only follow the congressional intent expressed in a
statute, but the judge must respect the means by which Congress
desires to manifest this intent. And, to the extent that "Congress per-
42 See In re Arnold Print Works, Inc., 815 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1987).
43 See Breyer, supra note 6, at 854-55.
44 Spence, supra note 13, at 601, referring to Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism
Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399.
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forms its responsibilities through committees and delegates to staff
the writing of its reports, it is Congress' evident intention that an ex-
planation of what it has done be obtained from these extrinsic
materials."45
As such, legislative history reflects a "deliberate decision by Con-
gress to have an official record that complements and supplements
the statutory provisions."46 To reject it is to "second guess Congress'
chosen form of organization and delegation of authority, and to
doubt its ability to oversee its own constitutional functions effec-
tively."47 Under this approach, the "neutral" judge is not only decid-
ing a case; the judge is also evaluating and implicitly deciding the best
process by which to make law. At its most extreme, by ignoring proce-
dures which a judge considers "illegitimate," the rejection of legisla-
tive history could reflect a judicial attempt to cause Congress to
change its legislative process.
Finally, the notion that a judge could uncover the intent of Con-
gress by specifically eliminating the tools which it provides for this
purpose seems to indicate a subtle attitude ofjudicial superiority. By
finding an interpretive context outside that specified by Congress, the
textualist approach articulates, at best, that the judiciary has the ability
to determine what Congress meant without resort to materials which
it created to clarify its meaning. And, at worst, it indicates a belief that
the judiciary can and should create a better meaning. The bench, by
eliminating the legislature's formation of interpretive tools, would ele-
vate its discretionary powers to include congressional procedure,
rather than merely statutory interpretation.
The textualist approach, therefore, is properly criticized for in-
creasing the possibility ofjudicial excess and reducing judicial neutral-
ity through disrespect for congressional machinations. If "plain-
meaning" has these faults, is there a better method?
B. Legi-Textualism
Imaginative reconstruction constitutes the approach to legislative
history which most clearly, on its surface, seeks the "will" of the legisla-
ture. However, the difficulties of placing oneself expressly in the
shoes of another person, potentially from a different time period and
background, produce a significant margin for error. This is only
45 Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 277, 306
(1990).
46 Spence, supra note 13, at 597.
47 Wald, supra note 45, at 307.
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heightened by the fact that the judge must place himself, not in the
position of one legislator, but of an entire Congress. The unconscious
substitution of a judge's preconceived notion of what a "reasonable
Congress" would have done in an ambiguous situation enables the re-
placement of a cloudy congressional intent with a clearly-formulated
judicial policy decision, or at least a misinterpretation of its will.
Another problem with this process is that it may elevate the judi-
cial interpreter "well above the supposed role of the honest agent
faithfully implementing the intended commands of the supreme legis-
lature." 48 Even if the judge is able to remain dispassionate and re-
served, he or she risks assuming the role of the omnipotent
interpreter of what the legislature "really meant" to say, although it
didn't actually say it. This could raise the judge to a position of mak-
ing law, rather than interpreting statutes. In the creative interaction
of "text, context, and interpreter,"49 the latter could assume a position
superior to the constraints of the others.
In spite of these criticisms, imaginative reconstruction may be the
lesser of two evils when compared to textualism. The volume of legis-
lative materials at the judicial disposal provides the potential for a
more accurate understanding of the congressional mind than do
items which Congress may never have consulted and probably never
referenced (i.e., dictionaries and canons of construction). Even if a
judge deviates from the intent of the enacting Congress, a greater like-
lihood exists that the interpretation will be closer to the legislative will
than a decision made without any reference to legislative materials.
The legislative record provides signposts which can prevent the judici-
ary from straying too far from the congressional mind.
The "middle ground" approach, represented by Justice Breyer
and former-judge Mikva, appears to offer the greatest possibility of
constraining judicial innovation and preserving legislative supremacy.
Selective utilization of legislative history provides a mean between two
extremes, a combination of the best features of the other two ap-
proaches. On one hand, it employs the legislative roadmarks left by
Congress as a tool to uncover the meaning of a statute, and on the
other, avoids the subjectivity of reconstructing the will of legislators at
a specific but bygone place and time. Legislative history occupies a
position, neither greatest nor least, among the interpretive means at
the judicial disposal, and may be reviewed and quoted when lending
clarity to ambiguous statutory language.
48 Eskridge, supra note 30, at 386.
49 Id. at 390.
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Intuitively, this approach appears most reasonable. If Congress
has left us a trail, should we not follow it to understand the relevant
statutory result? It may be that legislative history will not always clarify
statutory language. However, the judge protects his or her neutrality
by utilizing it, and its constraints provide some assurance of his or her
dispassionateness. By following the reasoning utilized by Congress in
creating the statute, the will of the legislature is more likely expressed
in the judicial opinion. While such resort is not mandated, it is per-
mitted and encouraged when necessary.
This having been said, all interpretive tools are subject to misuse.
The cautious use of legislative history, however, creates moorings
which aid the judiciary in holding to its subordinate role as detached
interpreter. To ignore materials created by the persons who created
the statute at issue, in the process of its creation, is a greater act of
judicial overstepping than most potential missteps which could result
from the misuse of legislative history.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FORMULATING AND UTILIZNG
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Introduction
So, as it stands, legislative history is a useful aid forjudges in statu-
tory construction. Are there any ways in which this tool can be im-
proved? Legislative history has been characterized as an inaccurate
and corrupt mirror to reflect congressional intent. One criticism is
that, once legislators learn that courts will use legislative history to
interpret a statute, they will manipulate the history in order to pro-
duce the judicial outcomes that they could not achieve in the legisla-
tive process of voting on statutory language. In one revelatory
situation, the Court ignored the views of a legislator who had added
his comments to an act ten days after it had been passed.50
Others argue that interest groups which are unable to convince
Congress to implement their policy views in a statute will resort to the
legislative history. Indeed, it is "well known that technocrats, lobby-
ists, and attorneys have created a virtual cottage industry in fashioning
legislative history so that the Congress will appear to embrace their
particular view in a given statute." 1' As a result, legislative history is
created "under circumstances in which it is no longer reasonable to
50 See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 407 (1987).
51 StarT, supra note 8, at 377.
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rely on the floor speakers and committees that generate the legislative
record as proxies for congressional intent."
52
Finally, because the legislative record reflects numerous views, it
is possible to glean support for a variety of interpretive positions.
Judge Leventhal has compared the process of consulting legislative
history to a person who walks into a party and looks over the room
until he finds his friends:53 a judge can find support for many posi-
tions. Such selective consultation of legislative history, it is argued,
illustrates its inefficacy in unveiling the collective congressional will.
Given these genuine and pragmatic abuses and concerns, the use
of legislative history loses a bit of its luster. However, if a reliable legis-
lative history would facilitate the existence of the neutral, dispassion-
ate judge and protect the underlying principle of legislative
supremacy, then much effort should be exerted to protect the sanctity
of the legislative record. What, if anything, can be done (1) to obviate
the need for its use, (2) to guarantee its sanctity as an index of con-
gressional intent, and (3) to increase judicial accuracy in its employ?
B. It Is a Statute We Are Expounding: Precision in Drafting
In McCulloch v. Maryland,54 Chief Justice Marshall stated that
[w] e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."
55
In establishing that Congress had the power to charter a national
bank, even though such was not enumerated in the Constitution, he
asserted:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions
of Which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which
they may be carried into execution, would partake of a prolixity of a
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.
56
Implicit in this statement is the recognition that a statutory directive
must be explicit, detailed, and complex, in order to make clear the
dictates of the law. It is such exact legislative rendering which best
safeguards a limited judiciary and legislative supremacy, for the more
detailed a statute, the less room for judicial intervention.
With this background, the debate over legislative history could
evolve into the question of how judges can encourage precise and
complete statutory drafting, and so avoid any need for legislative his-
52 Note, supra note 10, at 1016.
53 See Wald, supra note 6, at 214 (quoting a conversation with Judge Harold
Leventhal).
54 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).




tory. Although there may be no cure for "the ordinary details of
meaning that all statutes occasionally leave indeterminate,"57 and ana-
lysts of statutory construction "accept that the details of statutory
meaning may derive from sources outside the text of the enacted leg-
islation,"58  the judiciary could at least seek to lessen this
phenomenon.
One way to ask the question of "how can judges encourage pre-
cise statutory drafting" is to make the converse query of "which
method of statutory interpretation allows the judiciary to deviate far-
thest from legislative intent?" If the legislature were to watch the
courts give an unintended construction to its legislation, it would be
more likely to be precise in its intentions so as to attain its political
objectives. From such a perspective, it appears that the textualist ap-
proach is the most attractive, because, as argued, it provides the po-
tential of a judicial interpretation which is farthest afield from the
original legislative intent.
Legislative history, on the other hand, constricts the range of
available alternatives for statutory construction, increasing the likeli-
hood of an interpretation in closer proximity to the intent of the legis-
lators. However, this produces a quandary. Should the courts
implement a method of statutory construction which is farthest from
legislative intent in order to force the legislature to reassert its
supremacy? Such an approach, while perhaps theoretically compel-
ling, is unattractive for the pragmatic reason that it may not work. If a
legislature does not correct its drafting ambiguity, and the court's de-
cision stands as binding precedent, subsequent decisions involving the
statute could spiral far beyond the original purpose of this approach.
One could argue in another way that the textualist approach en-
courages clear statutory drafting. If the legislature knows that a court
will look solely at the textual language, and not at the congressional
history, it may have more incentive to express its collective will clearly.
However, there are two flaws with this rationale, and the first involves
a question of degree. No matter how precisely a legislature may com-
pose a statute, it will never account for every single possible applica-
tion. Moreover, it may not be advantageous to explicitly delineate
every potential scenario in a statute, and to do so could make the stat-
ute cumbersome and unwieldy-to the point where the intended ef-
fect of the statute is obscured. Second, this is a form ofjudicial policy-
making. A textualistjudge decides thatjustice would best be served by
clear statutory language, so he or she refuses to utilize Congress' cho-
57 Manning, supra note 5, at 681.
58 Id. at 695.
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sen means of clarification in order to accomplish this goal. While the
end would be desirable, the means used to obtain it again derogates
the principle of legislative supremacy and the ideal of neutrality.
In the end, Justice Frankfurter may be correct that "[p] erfection
of draftsmanship is as unattainable as demonstrable correctness ofju-
dicial reading of legislation. '59 While increased statutory clarity is a
desirable goal, it is questionable whether judicial policies regarding
legislative history would make it possible to achieve this.
C. Reform Legislative History
Could a program of safeguards be implemented which would pu-
rify the process of formulating legislative history? Recognizing the im-
perfections of any approach, there are certainly steps which can be
taken. In 1978, Congress addressed the practice of inserting com-
ments into the legislative history after a statute had been passed by
enacting the so-called "bullet" reform, which "required the clear
marking of insertions into the Congressional Record."60 This enables a
reviewing judge to determine if a comment was entered into the legis-
lative history after the bill was passed or inserted by an absent member
of Congress. Stringent enforcement of the law would ease concern
over this particular abuse.
Some other proposals for reform have been suggested. For ex-
ample, Congress could seek to create a framework to separate reliable
and unreliable legislative history:
"Good" legislative history would include those comments made
when the opportunity to subvert majority decisionmaking that is
created by consulting the legislative record likely would not be ex-
ploited. "Bad" legislative history, in contrast, would include every-
thing else.61
Or, it could pass a concurrent resolution to affirm the legitimacy of
legislative history. This could include a list of what constitutes official
legislative history:
The resolution might make clear, for example, Congress' view of
the relative value of remarks made during floor debates.... Con-
gress should clearly state that it expects judges to consult legislative
history when the statutory language is ambiguous.
62
59 Frankfurter, supra note 2, at 546.
60 Starr, supra note 8, at 377.
61 Note, supra note 10, at 1020-21.
62 Spence, supra note 13, at 616.
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In short, there are steps which Congress could take to increase
the efficacy of legislative history to indicate its intent, and ways it could
reduce specific textualist objections to its use.
D. Legislative and Judicial Interaction and Education
While a perfectly "pure" legislative history may be an unattainable
ideal, are there any other ways to improve its accuracy in rendering
the intent of the legislature? Some commentators have argued that
the problem is not legislative history itself, but a lack of judicial inter-
action with Congress and an inadequate understanding by each
branch of the other's work: "The problem is thatjudges don't know as
much as they ought about the legislative process."63 Judges should
understand the role of committees in drafting statutes, the congres-
sional bureaucracy, and the compromises reflected in legislation. If
"[1] egislative products mirror Congress's scattered and decentralized
structure,"6 it follows that an accurate understanding of Congress
would facilitate an accurate understanding of the results of its
deliberations.
There are so many elements of "legislative history" that without
knowledge of the weight and significance of each in statutory forma-
tion, ajudge could easily be led astray. For example, all the following
have a different role and impact in the process of a bill becoming law:
The use of committee reports and floor debate (and the lack of it),
the difference between floor amendments and committee amend-
ments, the trade-offs between statutory language and committee re-
port language, the impact of conference committee changes in a
bill, the effect of conflicting interpretations given by members dur-
ing floor debate .... 65
For a judge to accurately ascertain a reasonable measure of legislative
intent, he or she must understand the difference in legitimacy, merit,
and use of the markings which would reveal it.
Congressional education is also a necessity. Mikva suggests send-
ing Congress a copy of decisions in which the judiciary interpreted an
ambiguous statute. Committee staff members could be required to
read the decisions which interpret the statutes that they themselves
drafted. This would alert the legislature to uncertainties in its work
63 Mikva, supra note 16, at 384.
64 Roger H. Davidson, What Judges Ought to Know About Lawmaking in Congress, in
JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMIY 90, 109 (Robert A. Katzman
ed., 1988).
65 Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 627, 634
(1987).
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product and provide the opportunity to clarify the statute so as to
more accurately reflect its intent. As he articulates, "most of the time
Congress does not read judicial opinions and does not know whether
courts properly interpreted the statute."66 Preservation of the primacy
of the legislature is not only a judicial responsibility, but the burden
also lies on Congress to assert its superiority by understanding how it
may be derogated. If, in fact, "the law-related articles in Congressional
Quarterly, the National Journal, and Time Magazine are often as close to
legal reading as legislators get,"67 the judiciary cannot be excessively
faulted if it occasionally misinterprets and subrogates the intent of the
legislature.
Such interaction could, and should, lead to agreed-upon meth-
ods of interpretation. Mikva posits that "Congress and the judges
should also agree on some canons of interpretation."68 Congress
should be aware of the tools used by the judiciary to shape its statutes,
and genuine agreement on the appropriate tools would facilitate the
enactment of legislative intent.
A significant by-product of such mutual understanding could be a
partial "uncorruption" of legislative history, accomplished without
specific reforms thereto. One author has argued that judicial resort
to legislative history necessarily corrupts it because such consultation
introduces an incentive to shape legislative history "to indicate sup-
port for results that could not have won majority support in Con-
gress."69 Perhaps if Congress knew that the judiciary possessed a
developed understanding of the legislative process, and it demon-
strated an ability to pick its way through floor statements to uncover
"legitimate" legislative intent, less incentive would exist for this manu-
factured "history."
Such interaction could also facilitate mutual respect between the
branches, banishing the sometimes-held judicial attitude that the leg-
islature does its work "capriciously, superficially, on the basis of the
limited subjective impressions of a few members of a legislative com-
mittee."70 It is essential to establish judicial respect for the legislative
branch and its processes, or at least an understanding thereof, be-
cause without such an attitude, the will of the "first branch" of the
government could be subverted by the "third branch" on the basis
that it better understands the best means to attain public policy goals.
66 Mikva, supra note 16, at 384.
67 Mikva, supra note 65, at 630.
68 Mikva, supra note 16, at 384.
69 Note, supra note 10, at 1016.
70 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRiAL: Myri- AND REALrry IN AMERICA 292 (1950),




The mountain of literature produced on judicial use of legislative
history has isolated and articulated the flaws with both its use and its
abandonment. And, no doubt, dangers exist in determining intent
from background history. However, to reject wholesale this product
of the legislative process on the belief thatjudges can more accurately
discern the meaning of a statute in its absence, presupposes ajudici-
ary which does not exist. Legislative history is a helpful tool that can
constrain judicial policy implementation, ensure judicial dispassion-
ateness and neutrality, and maintain the rightful role of Congress. We
cannot change human nature, and a judge may ardently espouse a
particular policy position, but we can minimize the opportnmity to en-
force it. Rather than abandon legislative records on the basis that
they can sometimes lead us astray, it may be more prudent to recog-
nize the potential pitfalls and exert efforts to erect bridges which span
the minefield.
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